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Abstract—Resources are presented for fostering
paper-based election technology. They comprise a diverse
collection of real and simulated ballot and survey images,
and software tools for ballot synthesis, registration, seg-
mentation, and ground-truthing. The grids underlying
the designated location of voter marks are extracted
from 13,315 degraded ballot images. The actual skew
angles of sample ballots, recorded as part of complete
ballot descriptions compiled with the interactive ground-
truthing tool, are compared with their automatically
extracted parameters. The average error is 0.1 degrees.
These results provide a baseline for the application of
digital image analysis to the scrutiny of electoral ballots.
Keywords- elections, challenged Minnesota ballots,
ballot data, document segmentation, ballot readers, mark
recognition.
I. INTRODUCTION
We report the availability of recently created re-
sources for election ballot analysis, and the results
that we have already obtained. Although paper-
based election technology has not been a major fo-
cus in the ICDAR community, it is closely related
to form and table analysis and, more generally, to
document image registration, segmentation, clas-
sification, information extraction and indexing.
The United States is almost unique among
nations in entrusting the conduct of elections to
a state and county based partisan (i.e., political
party) system. Leaving to others to debate the mer-
its of this system versus uniform country-wide ad-
ministration of elections by a sitting government,
we note only the recent worldwide resurgence
of interest in paper-based election technologies.
In the USA renewed interest was undoubtedly
prompted by Florida’s “butterfly ballots” and its
“hanging chads” that eventually resulted in the
Supreme Court’s decisive involvement in the Year
2000 Presidential Election. Since then, several
other countries have been insisting on a verifiable
paper audit trail (VPAT) and, more specifically, on
machine-and-human readable paper ballots.
The use of paper ballots does not, however,
guarantee fair, verifiable, fast and efficient elec-
tions. In a draft report on Voluntary Voting
Systems Guidelines for 2007 [1], the Security
and Transparency Subcommittee for the Techni-
cal Guidelines Development Committee of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) observes that the use of paper to provide
independent auditing capabilities in elections is
entirely practical, but that there are undeniably
open technical issues that can and should be
addressed.
Some of the limitations of current ballot-reader
technology are due to its gradual evolution from
optical mark recognition (OMR) and mark-sense
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readers with discrete photocells. Although virtu-
ally all ballot readers now use CCD or CMOS
optical scanners with CCD or CMOS arrays,
many ballot scanners still simply mimic OMR.
Furthermore, audit and recount techniques have
barely changed in the one hundred and fifty years
since the introduction of the “Australian Secret
Ballot.” Comprehensive background material on
the technical aspects of the electoral process can
be found in [2], [3].
Among questions that could be addressed by
Document Image Analysis (DIA) research are the
accuracy, repeatability and reliability of vote tal-
lies, and improved - i.e., faster and more objective
- verification and validation. At a lower level, these
processes require better imaging, page registration,
target location, vote-mark detection, and greater
use of within-ballot context to discriminate vote
marks and noise from illegal violations of voter
anonymity. We have conducted research on Paper
and Electronic Records for Elections: Cultivating
Trust (PERFECT) since 2007 with the conviction
that any resulting improvements can benefit other
DIA applications as well [4], [5].
We describe in Sections II and III our data and
software in the hope that other research groups
can also make use of the resources that we have
developed. In Section IV we report our current
results on recent real-life ballots that we believe
make a strong case for increased DIA attention.
The only research that we have found along this
line is the simultaneous interactive ballot verifica-
tion reported in [6].
II. RESOURCES
Since at first we had no source of marked
ballots, we generated synthetic marks generated
on a real ballot layout. 21 pages were synthesized
with the BallotGen toolkit [7]. The simulated
ballots contained filled ovals, check marks, X’s,
and dots that were scaled, rotated and lightened or
darkened, each at five parameter settings. The pa-
rameters for each mark were specified in a spread-
sheet and compiled into BallotGen’s command-
line input.
Recognition results on five of the above ballots
(about 300 marks) are described in [8], [9]. Com-
parison of the results of four preprocessing and
mark detection methods on the synthesized digital
images and on the corresponding printed and
scanned images showed that the primary source
of errors were marks with insufficient contrast
(< 25% of “normal” reflectance) for adequate
digitization. In contrast to the experiments pre-
sented in Section IV, these methods did not utilize
the alignment of the target ovals on the page
because they were designed to find the best way to
discriminate voter marks from other scribbles that
could invalidate a ballot. The fraction of marks
detected with the best combination of methods
ranged from 87% to 90%, but there were many
(∼25%) false alarms. The specifications and the
synthesized image files are posted on the PER-
FECT website [10].
We have also obtained several hundred real
ballots from the 2006 general election and earlier
primaries in New York State. Only a dozen of
these have been scanned. These images are also
posted on the PERFECT website.
BallotTool is a collection of software compo-
nents (including BallotGen) integrated in a graph-
ical user interface with versions that run under the
Linux and Microsoft Windows operating systems.
It was used to generate ballot-like surveys in a
series of human-factors experiments on students.
Some of these experiments, conducted in conjunc-
tion with researchers from the Muhlenberg Insti-
tute of Public Opinion, explored to what extent
students’ predisposition affects their judgment in
interpreting ambiguous marks. 125 of these survey
forms, scanned into TIFF files with corresponding
Ground-Truth, are posted on the PERFECT web-
site. Other ballot-like survey forms were collected
in Lehigh University courses that introduced stu-
dents to technical problems related to the electoral
process. A total of 188 page images from eleven
sets of these surveys (each containing 30 questions
and answers) are posted on PERFECT.
Viewed in isolation, voter marks are often am-
biguous. The ambiguity can often be resolved by
looking at the entire ballot, or even by considering
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Figure 1. Example of a challenged ballot image (4176 x 1856
pixels)
just the shape or position of neighboring marks.
The value of Bayesian style-based classification
of voter marks was demonstrated experimentally
using as training and test data some of the surveys
filled out by the Lehigh students [11].
PERFECT also carries some publications that
present proposals for a camera-based ballot reader
and for two methods (Unbiased Visual Audit Dis-
play and Homogenous Class Display) to improve
interactive ballot verification and validation.
The largest collection on the PERFECT website
consists of 13,435 ballot page images of 6737
challenged Minnesota ballots (Fig. 1) from the
2008 US general election. Because the experi-
ments reported below are based on this corpus,
the provenance and appearance of the ballots are
described in greater detail in Section III.
III. MINNESOTA CHALLENGED BALLOTS
During the 2008 General Election in the United
States, citizens in the State of Minnesota expressed
their preference for U.S. Senator (in addition to
U.S. President and dozens of other statewide and
local positions). Five senatorial candidates were
listed on the ballot. In the initial tally, Repub-
lican Norm Coleman received 1,211,590 votes
(41.988% of the votes cast) while Democrat Al
Franken received 1,211,375 votes (41.981%). Be-
cause of the closeness of the race, a mandatory
recount was ordered.
In the process of performing recounts, repre-
sentatives from either candidate could question
whether a ballot met the legal requirements set
by the State. The reason for the challenge was
noted on the (back of the) ballot in the presence
of election officials who stamped and initialed the
recto. Subsequently the challenged ballots were
photocopied, scanned and posted online by Min-
nesota Public Radio (NPR) (among others) for
public comment. The laws that govern the validity
of the cast votes, directives for recounts, and the
challenge process, are summarized in [12], which
also shows many ambiguous examples that divided
voting officials and lay voters alike.
To collect all of the ballots from the NPR
website, we wrote a simple web crawler that
downloaded the files, saving them under their
original file names. Another program was then
used to extract the images from the PDF and save
the recto and verso of each ballot as a separate
TIFF file. Examination of the images suggests
that most of the ballots were scanned at 300 dpi
bitonal, but some of the longer ballots must have
been scanned at about 240 dpi (this assessment is
based on the assumption that these ballots were
printed or copied on 8.5” wide paper), and that
they never underwent lossy compression. Hence,
they form an ideal dataset for document analysis
research.
Challenges occurred in most of Minnesota’s 98
counties and 4130 election precincts (including
split precincts with several school districts). In a
typical precinct, the voter must consider over 75
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choices and mark 25 targets for a complete ballot.
The layout of the ballots differs from county to
county because of differences in the positions up
for election, the number of candidates in each race,
and the propositions presented for an up-or-down
vote.
Although all the ballots are laid out in equally-
spaced columns, there are differences in the size
and configuration of the headers and instructions
in addition to that of the local races. The mandated
minimum type size is 6 points for instructions
but the candidates’ names must be set in at least
10-point type. The races, from Federal Offices to
Judicial Offices, and the candidates or propositions
within the races, must be listed in a specified order.
Most of the Minnesota ballot templates were
provided by two different vendors. One template
(Fig. 1) has fiducial marks in the corners (a circle
with a cross), uniformly spaced rectangular index
bars in the left margin on the recto and in the
right margin on the verso, and identical position-
coded and numbered identification bars next to the
index bars. The other type has smaller index bars
along the top and both sides, and position-coded
identification bars along the bottom. Many index
bars were partially or completely lost in copying
or scanning.
Although dedicated ballot scanners may have
more reliable paper transports, if the supply at
a polling station runs out, ballots may be photo-
copied. This may add to distortion and degradation
introduced by the scanning process.
IV. EXPERIMENTS ON THE MINNESOTA
BALLOTS
The experiments consisted of four different
parts carried out separately and at different times:
(A) Automated detection of the underlying bal-
lot grid; (B) Interactive entry of all significant
information (i.e., ground truth) using BallotTool;
(C) analysis of the ground truth results; and (D)
comparison of ground-truth target oval coordinates
with the extracted grid.
A. Extraction of the target grid
Preliminary experiments to locate rulings and
the small registration marks (⊕) in the extreme
corners showed that they were often missing in
the images. The target grid is therefore extracted
by locating the alignment of either the solid black
horizontal index bars or the empty target ovals.
Two different methods are necessary because nei-
ther is reliable on all ballots. Excessive skew in
photocopying or scanning eliminates most of the
index bars because they are located near the edges
of the paper. On the other hand, scanner settings
that result in very light scans render it impossible
to locate the target ovals that even on normal scans
have a line thickness of only one or two pixels.
In the Challenged Minnesota data, each of these
conditions occurs relatively rarely (< 8%), and the
combination is, fortunately, very rare (< 1%).
The major processing steps, described in
greater detail in [13], are the following
1. Remove rules, text, & noise with adaptive morphological
filters
2. Perform connected component (CC) analysis
3. Eliminate CCs with shape or size different from index
bars
4. Compute Hough transform to select aligned index bars
5. Select the most populated horizontal and vertical align-
ments
6. Check spacing, slopes, and alignments against tolerances
7. Switch to oval detection if not enough good index bars
8. Locate CCs with size and aspect ratio of ovals
9. Find near-horizontally and near-vertically aligned ovals
10. Check if within tolerance, otherwise reject
11. Record five grid parameters and plot grid
Some preprocessing is common to both meth-
ods. The filter kernels are iteratively adapted to
accommodate variations in dpi and in the number
of races (1-30) on the page. Furthermore, it is
assumed that the approximate size and aspect ratio
of the index bars and ovals, and their spacing, are
known to within a factor of two because the vari-
ation due to different ballot designs and different
scanning resolutions falls within this range. All
of the ballots have one, two, or three columns
of targets. The width of the ballot images ranged
from 1136 to 4127 pixels, and their height from
1904 to 5056 pixels. The maximum skew observed
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was 22◦.
The final output consists of five grid parame-
ters (xo, yo, θ,∆x,∆y) for each page image. The
program found enough index bars on 96% of the
13,345 images and rejected fewer than 1% of
the pages. Figure 2 displays the range of results.
The unoptimized Matlab code ran in 8.3 seconds
per page on a 2.83 GHz processor with 32GB
RAM. Since we had no ground truth at the time,
we sampled 1031 randomly selected pages. All
nine of the pages where the program failed were
anomalous broken-arrow or absentee ballots. The
visually reported accuracy on this 10% sample was
in good agreement with the ground-truth based
comparison reported below.
B. Interactive ballot data entry
A special interface that is part of BallotTool is
currently being used by teams of students to obtain
detailed Ground-Truth for each of these images,
Figure 3. So far about 600 ballots have been
processed. For each image the operator generates a
CSV file indicating the races present on the ballot
and the order of the candidates. The skew-angle
of the whole page is determined by aligning a
ruling line with a line predrawn on the ballot.
The location of each marked (oval) target, the
presence of overvotes, undervotes, and the position
and kind of any other markup added to the original
ballot are also identified. The operators also record
their opinion about the validity of the vote in
each race, and may add freeform notes, comments
or observations. Processing of each ballot takes
about 10 minutes once the operator is trained.
Preparation of each needed CSV file also takes
about 10 minutes. New CSV files are needed every
2-10 ballots depending on how many challenged
ballots were collected from each voting precinct.
The text files containing the Ground-Truth are
posted on PERFECT. Part of these keyword-value
files have been converted to fixed-format Excel
worksheets for greater ease of use (Fig. 4). Some
other recorded information cannot, however, be
readily accommodated by a spreadsheet.
Figure 2. Twelve samples of ballot grids
C. Analysis of ground truth results
There were many reasons these ballots were
chosen to be challenged by the political parties.
Usually the reason indicated is that the voter
did not follow the instructions indicated on the
ballot precisely. Of the 620 ballots ground truthed,
444 ballots have handwriting by the officials who
reviewed the ballots. 111 of the ballots contain
stray marks, 36 have cancelled votes and 116 have
handwriting from the voter. On 484 ballots the
voter indicated his or her choice with filled ovals
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Figure 3. Screen shot of the BallotTool interface. A ballot image
with location of one valid and one cancelled vote are shown with
the screen to indicate what will be drawn on the image.
Figure 4. Recorded Ground Truth for Blue Earth County ballots.
In addition to the voter marks, the location and type of extraneous
marks, by both the voter and by election officials, are recorded
(but not shown here). Some of the longer fields are necessarily
truncated.
as indicated in the instructions. However the voters
used partially filled ovals on 173 ballots, x-marks
on 30 ballots, check marks on 14 ballots and other
marks on 22 ballots to indicate their votes. On 117
ballots the voter used two mark types and on 5 of
those ballots three mark types were used.
D. Comparison of extracted grid with ground
truth
The groundtruther was asked to indicate the
skew of the ballot by using a line tool to select
two endpoints of any horizontal rule on the ballot.
Figure 5. Frequency of skews in ground truthed challenged ballots.
For 530 of the ballots we have collected this
information. When a ballot was ground truthed by
multiple people, their skew measurements had a
standard deviation less than 0.05◦. The majority
of the ballots had less than 0.5◦ absolute skew,
Figure 5. The target grid extraction software can
also calculate the skew. The automatic results were
compared to the manual results. The mean error
was 0.12◦ and the standard deviation of the error
was 0.24◦.
V. SUMMARY
Obtaining access to hand-marked ballots cre-
ated by voters for use in real elections has been
problematic due to various legal constraints. Fortu-
nately, a recent turn of events created an unprece-
dented opportunity to address this situation. We
have assembled a large-scale dataset consisting of
voter-marked ballot images from the 2008 General
Election that was challenged due to the contested
Senate Race in the State of Minnesota. So far as
we are aware, this is the first such collection ever
made openly available and hence is an invaluable
resource to those wishing to develop better image
processing and pattern recognition methods for
reading op-scan ballots.
The ground truthing tool provides information
on each ballot that far exceeds what is extracted
by commercial ballot counters. In addition to the
location and kind of marks, extraneous marks that
may lead to invalidating a ballot are recorded. All
operator interactions are time stamped in order
to provide guidelines for future ground-truthing
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efforts. We note that reconciling the assigned
file names with the correct county and precinct
designation was itself a time-consuming task.
We have also provided baseline image process-
ing results that enable other researchers to conduct
experiments on improved target location, mark
detection, and stray mark characterization with
less effort. The automatically extracted grid allows
determination of the potential location of the oval
targets and vote marks to within 2-3 pixels.
Our main contribution is the assembly of re-
sources and the customization of well-established
methods focused specifically on paper ballots.
Nevertheless such research, in addition to improv-
ing a significant segment of contemporary election
technology, may also benefit many other areas
(e.g. standardized testing and application forms for
various services) that rely on secure mark sensing.
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